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Are the debt-equity swaps an opportunity to finance partially the Nepad? 
Some evidences from a theoretical model 
Abstract:  
The adoption of the New Partnership for the Development of Africa (Nepad) in 2001 ensured the clarification of 
the priorities which underlie this initiative which tries to be global and integrated. One of them is based on the 
reduction of debt and the stimulation of the FDI. Our contribution tries to link these two objectives through the 
implementation of the debt-equity swaps mechanisms. Despite the controversies which characterize them, we re-
examine these market solutions and determine the allocation of resources between the different participants to 
these transactions through a theoretical model inspired by Helpman (1989) and Bowe & Dean (1993).   
Keywords: Nepad, debt reduction, FDI, debt-equity swaps, resource allocation, modelling 
JEL classification codes: F21 F34 F36 G15 H63 
 
Introduction 
Drawn up by five African heads of state and taken up in July 2001, the New Partnership for the 
Development of Africa (Nepad) proposes a view and a strategic framework for the fight against 
poverty and the establishment of sustained conditions of economic growth and development. Among 
the defined priorities, a central role is devoted to the mobilisation of financial resources particularly 
for the reduction of the external debts and massive inward foreign direct investments (FDI) flows. 
The idea which would seem to prevail is based on dissociation between the reduction of debts and the 
appeal of the foreign direct investments. An alternative shift consists to adjoin to any debt reduction, a 
counterpart aiming at giving impetus to a process of economic growth. This approach which is the 
cornerstone of the debt-equity swaps has been implemented since the beginning of the eighties 
successfully in Chile which is a country which was subjected to combined action of over borrowing 
and the growing shortage of the FDI. 
The attempts of generalised extrapolation of these mechanisms in Africa come up a priori against a 
certain number of constraints (differences in the nature of the debts, absence of financial markets 
allowing the quotation of the debts and their conversions, lack of concrete perspectives of 
investments). However, the eligibility for the conversions of the debts of the Club of Paris from 1991 
(Eclac, 1999) constitutes a real opportunity for launching again the idea of a large establishment of the 
debt-equity swaps in Africa by including it in the strategic framework of the Nepad. 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the relevance of such a perspective in sub-Saharan Africa 
through theoretical model and to study the impacts of these mechanisms in terms of the allocation of 
resources which are oriented towards integrative and federator programmes like the Nepad initiative.  
As a starting point, we stress out the interest in taking up the debt-equity swaps mechanisms by 
analysing again the dynamics of indebtedness and investment in sub-Saharan countries. In the second 
part, we establish a theoretical model centred on the debt-equity swaps and describe the repartition of 
the resources between the different actors of transactions particularly the debtor countries. 
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I- Foreign debt and FDI in Africa: necessity for a combined solution? 
The Nepad constitutes a great leap in terms of content, objectives and procedure of implementation1. 
One of the asserted priorities of this global initiative goes inexorably through a reduction of a certain 
category of debts and a stimulation of the FDI flows. Beforehand, what is the real point about the 
situation of indebtedness of Sub-Saharan Africa?  
I-1/ The Debt of African countries: a burden which should be put into perspective  
Even if the Nepad is intended to a strategic framework to the whole African countries, we will focus 
on the case which is a priori the most critical of the sub-Saharan debt. 
Table 1: Sub-Saharan Africa - Total External Debt and Conditions of Loans 
Millions US $ 1990-1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total external debt stocks 209 211 203 212 231 238 215 173 
Use of IMF credit  7 7 6 7 7 7 6 3 
Short-term debt outstanding   34 32 31 28 30 33 32 35 
Long-term debt outstanding (1) 167 173 166 177 194 198 177 134 
(1) Decomposition of the long-term debt (billions USD and percent) 
Long-term debt outstanding 160 163 156 166 183 185 166 127 
Private nonguaranteed 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 9% 
Public & publicly guaranteed (2) 99% 99% 99% 99% 98% 99% 99% 91% 
(2) Decomposition of the public and publicly guaranteed debts (billions USD and percent) 
Public and publicly debt 134 147 142 151 168 170 147 105 
Official creditors (3) 94% 92% 91% 92% 91% 92% 91% 82% 
Private creditors (4) 6% 8% 9% 8% 9% 8% 9% 18% 
(3) Decomposition of the debt due to official creditors (billions USD and percent) 
Official creditors 126 135 130 139 153 156 134 86 
Bilateral debt 61% 60% 58% 56% 55% 51% 45% 49% 
Multilateral debt 39% 40% 42% 44% 45% 49% 55% 51% 
(4) Decomposition of the debt due to private creditors (billions USD and percent) 
Private creditors 29 18 18 19 23 25 28 31 
Bonds 1% 8% 14% 20% 36% 35% 32% 33% 
Commercial banks   40% 46% 39% 38% 32% 41% 48% 49% 
Other private creditors  59% 46% 47% 42% 32% 24% 20% 18% 
Source: Author on World Bank data. Global Development Finance. 2008 
During the nineties and the years 2000, the stock of the debt of sub-Saharan Africa is set on a basic 
yearly average of about 211 billion USD. The evolution of the foreign debt is understandable 
because of the preponderance of the long-term part which reaches 82 percent of the global stock, i.e. 
173 billion USD on average whereas the short-term part is 15 percent, i.e. 32 billion USD. In 
addition, the sub-Saharan debt is characterised by the little recourse to the lines of credit of IMF (3 
percent on average) which would be understandable because of the difficulty in submitting to the 
terms laid down by this institution. 
The examination of the long-term foreign debt, main elements of the total external debt, shows 
important aspects. First, the part of the public debt which is publicly guaranteed almost reaches 98 
                                                 
1 A good synthesis of the Nepad is provided in NEPAD (2001), NEPAD (2002 a-e), African Union (2002), 
Franke et Nsouli (2003) 
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percent, i.e. 160 billion USD on average with a small decline in 2006. Secondly, the official 
creditors have about 9/10 of the global debt and they only let the balance to the private creditors 
even if the part of these latter has grew more than usual in 2006. The fact that the debt is basically 
from an official source makes it less vulnerable to sharp cancellation of refinancing of the main one. 
Thirdly, the debt of sub-Saharan Africa remains more bilateral rather than multilateral even if a 
trend reversal appears progressively. The multilateral part is deeply dominated by compromising 
debts which remain more important during this period. The primacy of the multilateral debt and the 
official bilateral one would suggest that the search for solution would be in function of the political 
considerations of the creditor countries. Fourthly, the private creditors which are the minority 
initially dominated by the other private creditors2 (59 percent) between 1990 and 1999, see that the 
role of these latter diminishes progressively to reach 18 percent in 2006. This decline occurs above 
all for the benefit of holders of bonds and commercial banks (33 and 49 percent in 2006). 
A subtle analysis of the Sub-Saharan debt would be to its advantage to examine the effective burden it 
constitutes. To try to explain the burden of the debt through the debt service does not seem to be 
appropriate because this latter takes into account the principal. It appears less precise than the ratio of 
the payments of interests to the exports of goods and services as the principal is completely 
« rollover » for most of the countries. Even if a cancellation of the refinancing of the principal by the 
official creditors can occur because of inappropriate national economic policies, at this moment, the 
problem would not be related to the burden of the debt but rather to the lack of appropriate reforms. 
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Figure 1: Comparison ratios of debt service on exports of goods and services between Sub Saharan   
Africa (SSA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
Source: Author on World Bank data. Global Development Finance. 2008 
                                                 
2 It is about industrials, exporting countries, other assets and bank credit exporting guaranteed by an 
agency of export credit (definition by World Bank, 2004). 
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Like William Cline (1994), we consider that it would be more useful to see what the country spends 
really as far as its international commitments are concerned. A suitable indicator would be then the 
ratio of payments of interests on the debt related to the exports of goods and services. This ratio is 
relevant for, in one hand, it takes into account both the stocks of debts and the levels of interests; in the 
other hand, the burden of the debt disappears as soon as the debtor country cancels his payments.  
The payments of interests as percentage of the exports of goods and services has experienced 
a certain stability at 5 percent since 80’ then decreases to stay at 3 percent with the massive 
cancellation of most of Sub Saharan Africa whereas Latin American ratio reached 23% in the 
80’ then 12% in the 90’ and follows trendily its decrease. Globally, the weakness of the 
indicators of the sub-Saharan debt is not surprising in itself. This situation would be explained 
through the fact that, though they are evicted from the international capital markets many sub-
Saharan countries do not mainly resort to multilateral and bilateral loans and this is basically 
in concessional terms. However, a cancellation is possible in the bilateral part. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of interest payments on exports of goods and services between Sub Saharan   Africa 
(SSA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
Source: Author on World Bank data. Global Development Finance. 2008 
 
Through the exclusive lenses of the standard tools of analysis of the sovereign over borrowing, the 
perception of the weight of the debt of sub-Saharan Africa suffers from many wrong ideas. The real 
concerns which are aroused do not always depend on the weight of the debt but on other factors. 
Between 1980 and 1990, Mathew Martin (1991) had already observed the persistence of the sub-
Saharan debt in the international economic debates whereas its liabilities were only of 156 billions 
USD, which is 12 percent of the liabilities of the debt of developing countries and only 20 milliards 
USD more than the Brazilian debt. What was problematic was not really the amount but rather the 
context of real concerns linked the relative weight of the debt which came along with other economic 
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difficulties. This largely contributed to undermine the trust of the national and international economic 
actors affecting thus negatively their investments in particular the FDI. 
 I-2/ FDI flows in Africa: a noticeable and insufficient improvement 
In general, Africa is confronted to the main problem of sustained stimulation of the economic growth. 
One of the first targeted levers is based on the improvement of the environment of investment which 
has been weakly dynamic in Africa. Before 2000, the inward FDI flows in Africa are globally 
marginal comparatively to Latin America and the Caribbean countries. In the 2000’, the FDI flows 
remain more important in Latin America and the Caribbean countries which increased 4 times between 
2000 and 2007 even if the FDI towards Africa have been multiplied by 8 in the same period. 
Moreover, the part of the gross private capital flows related to the GDP is weak as well, causing thus 
the apparition of two main problems. On one hand, Sub-Saharan Africa would not benefit sufficiently 
from potential contributions of foreign private investments: domestic investment, domestic financial 
development, technology spillover and the productivity of investment (Fuchs-Schünden and Funke, 
2001). On the other hand, the continent is almost dependent of the Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), unpredictable and declining. 
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Figure 3 : Inward FDI flows in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, 1970-2007 
Source: Author on World Bank data. Global Development Finance. 2008 
The FDI have experienced a regular increase in Africa with a superior landing from 1997. A strong 
recovery is noticeable since 2004 due to liberal policies launched in the continent (signatures of 
bilateral agreements with the European Union and the United States of America, speeding-ups of 
initiative such as the AGOA3). Globally, since 2004, the FDI flows have increased in 36 African 
countries and have decreased in 17 countries the year before.  
                                                 
3  Extension until 2015 of the American law on the growth and the potentialities of Africa (AGOA). 
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It is above all countries rich in natural resources (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and 
Sudan) which attracted investments from multinational enterprises. Other sectors like the 
services and manufacturing industries have, to a lesser extent, benefited from FDI. In a 
general way, North Africa remains a privileged destination for this type of investments thanks 
in particular to the strengthening of the operations of relocations and of the established 
dynamic tourist policies. More than a third of the investments made in Africa remain devoted 
to North Africa. Morocco remains the first beneficiary of the FDI and has succeeded in 
strengthening his positions in 2003. 
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Figure 4 : Inward FDI flows as a percentage of GFCF in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, 
1970-2007 
Source: Author on Unctad data. World Investment Report. 2007 
 
The proportion of the FDI as percentage of the gross fixed capital formation has also improved itself 
but it knows some fluctuations. During a long time, the African ratio was below those Latin American 
and the Caribbean. Since 2004, a reverse movement can be observed. This ratio was in the low bracket 
of the noticed average in the developing countries in the late 90’s and at the beginning of 2000. It has 
considerably increased in order to be above the average of Latin American countries not to say the 
developing countries. The growth of the FDI in Africa beyond 2004 seems to be strong thanks to the 
potentialities in natural resources of the continent, the dynamism of the global markets of commodities 
and the change of the frame of mind of the investors due to the efforts made in terms of the structural 
adjustment conducted in most of the countries. But, the way to go is still long. An effort of sustained 
adjustment should be maintained vis-à-vis the Latin American countries subjected to a continuous 
decline of the proportion of FDI flows on GFCF. 
This effort seems to be taken into account in the strategic documents of the NEPAD which, besides the 
fact of pacifying the continent and adapting the economies, put an emphasis in particular on an active 
and sustained policy of the stimulation of the FDI flows. This perspective coincides with the purposes 
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of the debt-equity swaps. To get oriented towards these mechanisms presents a double interests: on 
one hand, it gives a partial alternative which resorts systematically to the international assistance and 
on the other hand, it sends a strong signal encouraging the investors to get interested in the economic 
projects initiated by the Nepad. 
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Figure 5 : Debt-equity swaps - example of transaction 
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II- MODEL OF DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS  
We will first set out the founding hypotheses of the model before proceeding to the determination of 
the analytical framework. 
II-1/ The founding assumptions  
The basic hypotheses of our model are the following ones: 
- The indebted country has yearly reel revenue, considered as a random variable. 
- The external debt of the country is completely held by the public authorities either directly or 
indirectly trough the “socialisation” of the private debts. 
- The model accepts as participants to the program of debt-equity swap three economic agents 
(the debtor country, the foreign creditors and the foreign investors). They are neutral to the risks. 
It is agreed that there are other economic residents’ agents for whom the model modifies the 
resources though they are not active. 
- There is a control over the international capital movements so that all the industrial assets are 
held by the residents of debtor country. 
- The economic agents taking part in the transactions are supposed to act so that their actions 
cause a situation of improved indebtedness for the debtor country. 
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II-2/ Analytical framework 
In order to face variable revenue, a country gets into debt by undertaking to invest in a project 
allowing him to repay the debt. We conform to standard models of debt by considering two periods of 
analysis. The first one t=0 during which the debt and the investment are carried out. The second one 
t=1 during which the programs of debt-equity swaps are settled and the revenues generated by the 
investment project, are used for repaying partially or totally the residual debt (difference between the 
initially incurred debt and the reductions conducted through the debt-equity swaps). At the end of this 
period, there is a liquidation of the project and all the assets are sold. 
The model will be established in three stages. 
1srt Stage: emergence of an idea of the investment project  
Let us consider a country where an investment project is realised which is of a global value I at 0=t . 
The project is supposed to produce at  a volume  defined by1=t Q AQ Φ= . 
The coefficient  illustrates the states of nature which are associated to the investment project and Φ A  
the level of activity, function of the assets held by the firms which are embarked on the production of 
the investment project. To illustrate the transition from unfavourable hazards to favourable ones, we 
make  evolve towards  with  preferred to Φ 'Φ 'Φ Φ  ( Φ>Φ '
V
).  The future value expected from the 
investment project can be described by the following relation:   ∫
Φ
ΦΦΦ=
m
dQp
0
)()(
2nd stage: situation prior to the establishment of debt-equity swaps 
In the initial situation, a country holds at 0=t , an external debt  while undertaking to repay 
 at due to the payment of debt service (principal and accrued interests).  
D
)1( rD + 1=t
Let us suppose that the resources of the debt are used for financing partly or totally the initial 
investment of the project described in the first stage. This hypothesis, explicit for Bowe and Dean 
(1993) but not at all for Helpman (1989), is a main characteristic of the project. Indeed, if these 
resources were funds or were reserved to the purchase of other assets, the debt should be held, at least 
partially, in the form of funds or other assets and not, as it is supposed by Helpman (1989), in the form 
of opportunities for investment. 
To face its commitment in the repayment of the external debt )1( rD +  at 1=t , the debtor country has 
a capacity of the taxation of the incomes generated by the investment project. The taxation is carried 
out at the rate of exogenous taxationτ . So, the importance of the transfers of resources from the 
debtor country to the foreign creditors remains dependent on the value made available by the 
investment project. We share this hypothesis common to Helpman (1989) and Bowe and Dean (1993), 
who estimate that the product collected during the taxation of the investment project is the only source 
of income of the debtor country. This proposition simplifies a lot the reality. Indeed, when the state 
invests directly in a firm, whether it is part of the minority or the majority, it receives a charge. 
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However, we keep the hypothesis of Helpman (1989) and of Bowe and Dean (1993) in order to avoid 
cramming our model. In addition, between 0=t  and 1=t , the state of nature Φ  is going to reveal 
itself. 
The fact that the debtor country has as only resource the taxes on the investment project reduces its 
field of action. If this latter appears insufficient for covering the debt service, the risks of non-payment 
become real. In this case, 1([Pr +<DQob r 0)]>τ  so 0)]1( >[Prob +<Φ rDAτ . Thus, there is a value 
 so that Φ
A
rD
τ
)1(* +=Φ  [1a] below which the payment of the debt would not be ensured. 
*Φ Φ<As Helpman (1989) supposed it, for values , the debtor country transfers to the foreign 
creditors the whole incomes of the taxation. This hypothesis is too much heavy because any State has 
to face certain incompressible expenses (functioning expenditures for instance). We relax it by 
considering that a portion η  of the collected taxes remains at with the debtor country. Thus, for 
values , the creditors receive the disposable income (taxes minus incompressible expenses) as 
debt reimbursement even if the collected taxes appear to be insufficient. For values , the 
surplus of the disposable income over the payment of the debt is partly (thus portion
*Φ<Φ
*Φ>Φ
α ) devoted again 
to all the economic resident agents of the debtor country agents as such the global transfers. The 
residual portion ( )1 α−  is held by the State. Therefore, the result [1a] turns into 
)1(
)1(
η−
+
A
r*Φ τ=
D
 [1b]. 
Let us remind also that the models of Helpman (1989), Bowe and Dean (1993) accepts only two kinds 
of participants: the foreign creditors considered as being investors and the debtor country too. 
However, it is more pragmatic to distinguish the foreign creditors from possible investors, considering 
the foundations of the debt-equity swaps. 
It is in this context that we attempt at identifying the resource allocation between the main participants 
in the debt-equity swaps transactions. 
The residents of the debtor country will receive, in the unfavourable states of nature ( ), the 
product after the taxation of the investment project since they are the only holders of assets. In the 
favourable state of nature ( ), they will have the set constituted of the product after taxation 
and a portion 
*Φ≤Φ
*Φ>Φ
α  of the global transfers.  for  [2a] 
⎩⎨
⎧
+−−+ )]1()1(1(
1(
rDAA ηΦ[ 'ταΦ−
Φ−
)
)
'
A
τ
τ
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧Φ
Φ
Φ>
Φ≤
*
*
As for the foreign creditors, their resources will consist of all the disposable income in the 
unfavourable states of nature and the complete payment of the debt in favourable states. 
  for   [2b] ⎩⎨
⎧
+
−Φ
)1(
)1(
rD
A ητ
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ Φ>Φ
Φ≤Φ
*
*
The debtor country will have at its disposal the resources which are used for covering the 
incompressible expenses in the unfavourable states of nature. They will obtain the set made up of the 
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resources of incompressible expenses and of the portion ( α−1 ) of the global transfers which are not 
devoted again to the resident agents in the favourable states of nature. 
  for   [2c] 
⎩⎨
⎧
−+−−Φ+Φ
Φ
)1)](1()1([ '' αητητ
ητ
rDAA
A
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ Φ>Φ
Φ≤Φ
*
*
The foreign investors do not receive any resource as they are not yet present in the country. 
3rd stage: situation which comes after the establishment of the debt-equity swaps 
The program of debt-equity swaps is going to ensure the exchange of a part  of the liabilities of the 
external debt , bought out in the secondary market by foreign investors in compensation of partial or 
complete capital acquisition of the firms in the debtor country.  
d
D
Thus, we put forward new assumptions: 
- The rate of taxation τ remains unchanged. 
- The exchange of the debt ensures to the debtor country to be at a better level of indebtedness 
characterised by the residual debt dD . Through this assumption, we carry out a bet on 
the rationality of the economic agents by supposing that the reduction of the debts recovers in 
the sense that if it brings them to a more improved level than before. Consequently, we estimate 
that the residual debt will be completely repaid at the due date in the states of nature 
)(* dΦ>  so that  
D −=*
Φ
0)]1)(()1()([Pr >+−≥−Φ rdDAdob ητ  hence
)1(
)1)(()(* ητ −
+−=Φ
A
rdDd . It is important to 
remind that . *)( Φ<Φ d
- At 1=t , the project comes to an end. We suppose that the assets are then transferred during this 
period. We remind that the transfer of assets is treated according to the rules of general 
accounting. Indeed, the product of the transfer of the assets is considered as exceptional products 
which are an element of the final result. Thus, a simple distribution of the product of the transfer 
would not be considered as possible. We suppose that in the unfavourable states of nature, the 
activity is low and the result is weak. On the other hand, in the favourable context, the result 
reaches a superior level. 
There is going to be two situations: one in which the program of the debt-equity swaps ensures the 
foreign investors to proceed to a partial capital acquisition of the project so that only one portion of the 
activity would be for them . Another one characterised by a complete capital acquisition of the 
investment project such as , not to say the creation of a new equivalent project. 
)( Aa <
Aa =
 
i. Debt-equity swaps with partial capital acquisition  of the project  
In the model of Bowe and Dean (1993), the foreign creditors buy out a portion of the debt so as to take 
a stake in the investment project. The foreign creditors are the investors themselves. We are going to 
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study this case. However, in order to be more conformed to a certain reality of the debt-equity swaps; 
we are going to dissociate these two types of economic agents. Thus we suppose that the creditors are 
more motivated by the recovery, even partial, of their items whereas the foreign investors want both to 
benefit from the business opportunities of the debtor country and to profit from the discount rate on 
the secondary market of the debt. We are all the more consolidated in this hypothesis that in many 
creditors’ native countries, strong constraints would tend to limit the capital acquisition of their banks 
in foreign countries.  
 A- Foreign creditors and foreign investors are not confused 
The implementation of the debt-equity swaps significantly modifies the allocation of resources. 
 The residents of the debtor country will receive in the unfavourable states of nature, the product after 
taxes on the residual activity which is the one taking into account the transfer of a portion of assets to 
foreign investors. In the favourable states of nature, they will have the product after the tax on the 
residual activity and a portion α  of the global transfer representing the surplus of the disposable 
income over the payment of the residual debt. 
  for  [2a] 
⎩⎨
⎧
+−−−Φ+−Φ−
−Φ−
)]1)(()1([)()1(
)()1(
'' rdDAaA
aA
ητατ
τ
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ Φ>Φ
Φ≤Φ
)(
)(
*
*
d
d
 The resources of the foreign creditors will consist, in the unfavourable states of nature, of the 
disposable income generated by the activity. In the favourable states of nature, they will receive the 
complete payment of the residual debt.  
  for     [2b] ⎩⎨
⎧
+−
−Φ
)1)((
)1(
rdD
A ητ
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ Φ>Φ
Φ≤Φ
)(
)(
*
*
d
d
 For the foreign investors, the resources are of the net product after taxes in proportion to their 
participation in the unfavourable states of nature. This would equal to a sort of payment of dividends. 
In the favourable ones, they will receive a product after tax but of a bigger amount than the time 
before due to the improvement of the economic situation of the debtor country. 
   for    [2c] 
⎩⎨
⎧
Φ−
Φ−
a
a
')1(
)1(
τ
τ
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ Φ>Φ
Φ≤Φ
)(
)(
*
*
d
d
 The debtor country will have at its disposal as resources in the unfavourable states of nature, the 
residual part of the collected taxes which ensure him to cover the level of incompressible expenses. In 
the favourable states of nature, he will receive in addition to its part which is not devoted to the 
residents of global transfers emanating from the surplus of the net product of the taxes on the payment 
of the residual debt: 
  for   [2d] 
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 B- Foreign creditors and foreign investors are not confused  
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From a transaction with three participants, we are going to another one with two directs participants. 
In this case, only the allocation in resources of the foreign creditors are going to be modified because 
they get more than it should be received the isolated foreign investors.  
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ii. Debt-equity swaps with total capital acquisition of the project  
The foreign investors hold all the capital of the investment project (a = A) and hoard the totality of the 
product after taxes on the project. There is going to be two cases. 
 A- Foreign creditors and foreign investors are not confused  
  The residents of the debtor country have no resources in the unfavourable states of nature except the 
wages from the project. The net product of the taxation on the total activity is transferred to foreign 
creditors whereas the product after taxes remains at the disposal of the foreign investors which have 
become the only owners of the project. In the favourable states of nature, they get, in addition to the 
wages, a portion α  of global transfers representing the net incomes of taxation over the complete 
payment of the residual debt.  
  for    [3a] 
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 Thanks to the foreign creditors, they get the totality of the net incomes generated by the taxation on 
the total activity of the investment project in the unfavourable states of nature. In case of favourable 
hazards, they get the complete payment of the residual debt.  
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 As for the investors, they get the product after taxes on the total activity of the investment project in 
the unfavourable states of nature. In the favourable states of nature, they benefit from the product after 
taxes on the total activity and it is reasonable to suppose that this last amount is superior considering 
the improvement of the economic situation of the debtor country.  
  for   [3c] 
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 The debtor country will have an invariable level.  
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 B- Foreign creditors and foreign investors are confused  
Only the allocations to the foreign creditors will be modified. In the unfavourable states of nature, they 
will get the net product of the taxation on the investment project and the product after taxes 
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)]1()1[( ητφτ −Φ+− AA . In the favourable states of nature, they will get the global payment of the 
residual debt to which we add the product after taxes.  
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II-3/ Synthesis of the results of the model and main lessons  
Some fundamental results develop different studied scenarios. First the implementation of the debt-
equity swaps increases the favourable states of nature to the effective payment of the residual debt 
(like ). This is explained by the sense given to the reduction of the facial value of the 
initial debt. We have stated it earlier in our initial hypothesis. This intuition results from the bet we 
carried out on the rationality of the actors of the transaction which do not proceed to these operations 
only if there is an opportunity to reduce the debts to a level less higher which was to be completely 
repaid.  
** )( Φ<Φ d
Secondly, an analysis costs – benefits of the situation of the different participants in the transactions 
leads to much contrasted situations. It is convenient to precise that the comparisons are made in 
function of the states of the nature: first the unfavourable states of nature and then the favourable ones. 
We also notice that the earnings of all the actors increase with the improvement of the hazards. 
Residents of the debtor country: they are the agents for whom the adoption of debt-equity swaps is a 
fact in which they do participate neither at the beginning nor while carrying out the transactions. Their 
resources decrease with the implementation of these mechanisms.  
In the unfavourable hazards, their incomes decrease till they are only formed of the wages while the 
capital acquisition is complete. This situation would be explained by the fact that they do not 
participate directly to the transactions.  
In the favourable hazards, a loss of income intervenes progressively between the partial capital 
acquisition and the total one.  
Foreign creditors:  
In the unfavourable hazards, the expected incomes do not vary whether it is in presence or not of debt-
equity swaps. They will receive the product of the disposable income (taxes minus incompressible 
expenses of the State).  
In the favourable hazards, they lose a portion of their resources. Indeed, since they cannot receive the 
totality of their claims, they get more than the payment of the residual debt when the debt-equity 
swaps are implemented. In this situation, they are neutral to the degree of capital acquisition of the 
project. 
Foreign investors: they are the winners in these operations. Though they have discharged an import 
duty in order to contribute to the transactions, we notice that their incomes increase in function of the 
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degree of capital acquisition of the project. In other words, the more important this one is, the higher 
the earnings are. When the capital acquisition is complete, they get the entire product after tax. 
Debtor country:  
In the unfavourable hazards, the resources remain invariable and are made of the residual part of taxes 
ensuring the covering of incompressible expenses. In favourable hazard, they increase with the debt-
equity swaps while remaining stable in spite of the degree of capital acquisition of the project.  
Creditor-Investor: in this case, the foreign creditors are confused with the foreign investors. 
In the unfavourable hazards, the resources increase with the implementation of debt-equity swaps. 
This increase is more definite when the capital acquisition of the project is complete.  
In the favourable hazards, the comparison of obtained resources between the complete and the partial 
capital acquisition remains favourable to the agents because they continue to increase. The comparison 
between situation prior to or following the implementation of debt-equity swaps is uncertain. 
Everything would depend then on the incomes of activity gotten from the project in relation to the loss 
because of the reduction of the initial debt.  Thus, the performances realised with the implementation 
of the project are integrated in the earnings of the creditors-investors.  
 
The evaluation of the resources of the implementation of the debt-equity swaps cannot lead to a 
definitive and globalising conclusion. The opportunities of earnings depend on one’s point of view. 
 
Conclusion  
In front of permanent and increasing challenges of the African continent, the NEPAD aims to find 
efficient, lasting and feasible solutions. It provides a strategic framework by defining a certain number 
of priorities among which the reduction of the debt and the stimulation of the FDI flows are. Our study 
fits into this perspective and proposes a combined action going from the resort to mechanisms of debt-
equity swaps. However, as these ones have been very controversial, we seek to evaluate them from a 
perspective of costs-benefits by focusing on the variations of monetary cash of the different 
participants in the transactions. Our inability in expressing a global and definitive judgement on the 
implementation of these mechanisms of market is based on the existence of earnings or potential 
losses of resources according to the adopted point of view. Indeed, the evaluation of the debt-equity 
swaps in terms of allocation of resources comes to an end through diverse fortunes for the different 
participants to the transactions. The foreign investors are the winners in these transactions in all the 
states of nature. For the debtor country, the programs are financially interesting in the favourable states 
of nature whereas the resources remain stable when the hazards are unfavourable. On the other hand, 
the potential losses are possible in all the states of nature for the residents of the debtor country which, 
at the beginning, had the entire assets. When the hazards are favourable, these transactions cause the 
losses of resources for the creditors which, however, manage in keeping their level of incomes in the 
unfavourable states of nature. In order to expect to be winners in any ways, the creditors have to be 
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also the investors on the condition that they also accepts the idea of taking into account the economic 
performances of the debtor country in the determination of the potential earnings. 
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